

Categoricity-like notions for first-order theories

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Day 1: Categoricity of PA

Dedekind Categoricity Theorem (1888). *There is a sentence σ in second order logic of the form $\forall X\varphi(X)$, where $\varphi(X)$ only has first order quantifiers, such that σ holds in a structure \mathcal{M} iff $\mathcal{M} \cong (\mathbb{N}, S, 0)$, where S is the successor function.*

Zermelo Quasi-categoricity Theorem (1930). *There is a sentence θ in second order logic of the form $\forall X\psi(X)$, where $\psi(X)$ only has first order quantifiers, such that θ holds in a structure \mathcal{M} iff $\mathcal{M} \cong (V_\kappa, \in)$, where κ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal.*

Question

Are "first-order counterparts" of these second order systems in a sense categorical?

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- 1 there is a designated *domain formula* \mathcal{L}_V -formula $\delta(x)$.
- 2 there is a designated mapping $P \mapsto F_P$ that translates each n -ary \mathcal{L}_U -predicate P into some n -ary \mathcal{L}_V -formula F_P (including the case when P is the equality relation).

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- 3 σ commutes with propositional connectives, and is subject to:

$$\sigma(\forall x\varphi) = \forall x (\delta(x) \rightarrow \sigma(\varphi)).$$

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such that for each $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_U$,

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The above definition is not ultimately general. Additionally one can allow

- *U -objects to be coded by tuples of V -objects;*
- *to use parameters.*

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Moreover, an interpretation \mathcal{I} based on σ such that $U \triangleleft^{\mathcal{I}} V$ gives rise to an *internal model construction* that **uniformly** builds a model $\mathcal{M}^{\mathcal{I}} \models U$ for any $\mathcal{M} \models V$, where $\mathcal{M}^{\mathcal{I}} := \sigma^{\mathcal{M}}$.

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A model \mathcal{N} for a language \mathcal{L}_1 is interpretable in a model \mathcal{M} for a language \mathcal{L}_2 iff there is a translation $\sigma : \mathcal{L}_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_2$ such that $\mathcal{N} = \sigma^{\mathcal{M}}$.

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Remark

Translations and interpretations can be composed. Given $T \triangleleft^{\mathcal{J}} U \triangleleft^{\mathcal{I}} V$, to define $\mathcal{I} \circ \mathcal{J}$, just compute the T model given by \mathcal{J} in the U -model given by \mathcal{I} .

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Model theoretic picture.

Some examples

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- If \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} are biinterpretable, their automorphism groups are isomorphic.

Day 1: Categoricity of PA

Tightness

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Definition

A theory U is minimalist iff for every $\mathcal{M} \models U$ and every $\mathcal{M} \trianglelefteq \mathcal{N} \models U$ there is **exactly one** \mathcal{M} -**definable** embedding $\mathcal{M} \hookrightarrow \mathcal{N}$.

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Proposition

Every minimalist theory is tight.

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This gives rise to the unique **definable** embedding of \mathcal{M} into \mathcal{N} . □

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In particular $K^n(\mathcal{M}) \models PA_n$.

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Observe that for every $x \in K^n(\mathcal{M})$

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Hence $\mathbb{N} \sqsubseteq K^n(\mathcal{M})$.

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- 3 Copy the definition of $K^n(\mathcal{M})$.

$$K^n(\mathcal{M}) \simeq \mathbb{N}$$

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- $\mathcal{I} \circ \mathcal{J} \sim \text{id}_{K^n(\mathcal{M})}$:
 - 1 given $x \in K^n(\mathcal{M})$ find its least Σ_n -definition $\phi_x \in \mathbb{N}$.
 - 2 map x to whatever ϕ_x defines (according to \mathbb{N} -definable satisfaction predicate) in $\mathcal{I} \circ \mathcal{J}$.

Day 1: Categoricity of PA


Solid theories

\mathcal{M} is a *retract* of \mathcal{N} iff there are

- interpretations \mathcal{I} and \mathcal{J} with $\mathcal{M} \triangleleft^{\mathcal{I}} \mathcal{N}$, and $\mathcal{N} \triangleleft^{\mathcal{J}} \mathcal{M}^*$
- a binary \mathcal{M} -formula F such that F is, \mathcal{M} -verifiably, an isomorphism between $\text{id}_{\mathcal{M}}$ (the identity interpretation on \mathcal{M}) and $\mathcal{J} \circ \mathcal{I}$.

Example

\mathbb{N} is a retract of $(\mathbb{Z}[X]_{\geq 0}, +, \times)$.



Based on a picture of Saul Steinberg (1962).

Definition

A theory U is solid iff whenever $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{N} \models U$ and

$$\mathcal{I} : \mathcal{M} \trianglelefteq \mathcal{N}$$

$$\mathcal{J} : \mathcal{N} \trianglelefteq \mathcal{N}^{\mathcal{J}}$$

witness that \mathcal{M} is a retract of \mathcal{N} , then there is an \mathcal{N} -definable isomorphism $\mathcal{N} \sim \mathcal{N}^{\mathcal{J}}$.

Remark

Minimalist \implies *Solidity* \implies *Tightness*.

Corollary

PA is solid but for every n , PA_n is not solid.